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ments inherent in remedy-making.n Butler is at least the third 0
decision since Bivens to expand the concept that was shaped there.
The extension appears appropriate in light of the relevant consider-
ations discussed here, and is consistent with Bivens.
Yet, the judiciary is not institutionally equipped, as is the legisla-
ture, to step into each and every perceived breach, weigh the
delicate balancing policies and weave its remedial web. It is true
that the courts can analyze policy and that they can and should
fashion remedies where remedies are required and justified. How-
ever, the judicial power is qualitatively different from the legislative
power, and the courts are unquestionably more restricted in terms
of time and resources available for remedy-making than is the Con-
gress. The judiciary should shoulder its responsibility for the protec-
tion of the individual and vindication of the Constitution willingly,
but should never do so without a clear understanding of what is
required for the vindication of the constitutional rights involved and
of the limitations of its own energies and talents. Evidence of such
an understanding is not obvious on a reading of Butler, and this, as
well as the actual decision rendered by the. court, is significant. As
the court demonstrated by its own reliance on the Moore holding,
the effects of any holding, even one lacking a verbalized rationale,
can have quite far-reaching effects in this developing area of the
law.
Susan K. Wright
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL PROTEC-
TION-VOTING RIGHTS OF Ex-FELONS-The United States Supreme
Court has held that California's disenfranchisement of convicted
felons who have completed their sentences and paroles did not vio-
late the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974).
When, in 1972, the individual respondents Ramirez, Lee and Gill
attempted to register to vote in their respective counties, their ap-
89. Id.
90. It joins United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) and Bethea
v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971).
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plications were refused by local election officials solely on the basis
of prior felony convictions.' All three respondents were charged with
their respective offenses some years ago and have successfully termi-
nated their paroles.2 Upon denial of their registration petitions, they
sought relief on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated
by way of peremptory writ of mandate,3 claiming that certain provi-
sions of the California Constitution,4 and the election code statutes5
implementing these provisions, denied them their federally consti-
tuted rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.' In Ramirez v. Brown,7 the California Supreme Court
held that the constitutional and statutory provisions challenged by
the plaintiffs Ramirez, Lee, and Gill, as ex-felons who had success-
1. Richardson v. Ramirez, 94 S. Ct. 2655 (1974).
2. Respondent Ramirez was convicted twenty-two years ago of robbery by assault and
spent three months in jail, followed by parole. Respondent Lee spent two years in prison for
possession of heroin, for which he was convicted nineteen years ago. Respondent Gill was
convicted on three different occasions for the felonies of burglary and forgery, and, after
serving some time in prison for each of these offenses, was successfully paroled.
3. In California, a writ of mandate is the equivalent of a writ of mandamus.
4. CAL. CONST. art. .I, § 3, provides, inter alia:
The Legislature shall prohibit improper practices that affect elections and shall pro-
vide that no severely mentally deficient person, insane person, person convicted of an
infamous crime, nor person convicted of embezzlement or misappropriation of public
money, shall exercise the privileges of an elector in this state.
Id. art. XX, § 11, provides:
Laws shall be made to exclude from office, serving on juries, and from the right of
suffrage, persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other
high crimes. The privilege of free suffrage shall be supported by laws regulating elec-
tions and prohibiting, under adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon from
power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practices.
See also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18 (1849).
5. See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 383 (West Supp. 1974); Id. §§ 389, 390 (West 1961), which
direct county election officials to cancel the registration of all voters convicted of infamous
crimes. For a complete listing of the election code statutes at issue see Ramirez v. Brown, 9
Cal. 3d 199 n.3, 507 P.2d 1345, 1348 n.3, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137, 140 n.3 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Ramirez].
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
7. 9 Cal. 3d 199, 507 P.2d 1345, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1973). This is the same case as the
one presently under discussion. For a brief explanation of its renaming see note 10 infra.
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fully completed their paroles,8 violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court
granted Richardson's petition for certiorari to determine the consti-
tutional validity of state disenfranchisement provisons.,
After determining that the unusual procedural history of the case
did not render it moot," the Supreme Court reached the substantive
issue: Did California's disenfranchisement of convicted felons con-
stitute a violation of the equal protection clause? Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority," entered into a discussion of both the legis-
lative and judicial history which he believed compelled the holding
that state disenfranchisement statutes and provisions as applied to
convicted ex-felons are constitutionally permissible. The Court
asserted that the fourteenth amendment explicitly sanctions such
state action and differentiated state disenfranchisement of ex-felons
from other voting limitations previously held invalid by the Su-
preme Court on equal protection grounds. 3 The majority cited the
8. The California Supreme Court cautiously confined its holding in Ramirez to persons
who have completed their sentences and paroles. 9 Cal. 3d at 217 n.18, 507 P.2d at 1357 n.18,
107 Cal. Rptr. at 149 n.18.
9. Ramirez v. Brown, 414 U.S. 816 (1973).
10. Before analyzing the substantive constitutional issues presented by the petitioners,
the Supreme Court entered into a complex and lengthy discussion of two fundamental proce-
dural issues: first, whether the acquiesence of the three named electoral officials rendered the
lower case moot; and second, whether the failure of the California court to issue the relief
requested, i.e., the peremptory writ of mandate, made that decision, in effect, an advisory
opinion and, as such, outside the purview of article I. Since the Supreme Court is bound
by the directive of article M, which requires a case and controversy, the Court conceded that
a present controversy would not exist if the case were limited to the named parties alone;
however, the introduction of the petitioner, Viola Richardson, was given considerable weight
by the majority who found that this action, although not technically labeled as such, was a
class action. Viola Richardson, as County Clerk of Mendocino County, had filed a complaint
of intervention in the lower court case of Ramirez, asserting that she was a defendant in a
similar suit brought by an ex-felon, and that the Ramirez suit would be dispositive of the
litigation then pending against her. The California court added petitioner Richardson to the
list of named defendants, by implication making her opponent an unnamed member of the
class of ex-felons cited in the original complaint. The Supreme Court further concluded that
the judgment of the California court was a declaratory judgment and not an advisory opinion
as argued by Justice Marshall in his dissent. 94 S. Ct. at 2672 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
Court declared:
The mere failure of a state court to award peremptory relief in a proceeding which it
treats as one for a declaratory judgement is not an "adequate state ground" which
precludes our review of its federal constitutional holding.
Id. at 2665 n.13.
11. He was joined by Justices Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell. Justices
Marshall and Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Douglas joined in part.
12. 94 S. Ct. at 2671.
13. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (equal protection clause used suc-
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apportionment formula of § 2 of the fourteenth amendment" as
controlling in the present case, accepting the proposi tion argued by
the petitioner that the express language of this section specifically
excludes ex-felons from the more general protective principles enun-
ciated in the equal protection clause.
Justice Rehnquist's argument was simple and direct: first, that §
2 deals directly with state voting qualifications; second, that it spe-
cifically exempts criminal offenders from the sanctions on voting
restrictions; and third, that the clear meaning of this language
ought to govern unless it can be shown that Congress intended oth-
erwise.15 In attempting to resolve the dilemma of history"6 and reach
the meaning and intent of this language, the Court firmly asserted
that the purposes and motives behind the passage of § 2 are insignif-
icant. Although the Court does not elaborate, a distinction is drawn
between purpose and motive on the one hand, and meaning and
intent on the other. Purpose and motive would be the social, politi-
cal, and economic factors which caused the 39th Congress to draft
and pass this section of the amendment, while meaning and intent
cessfully to strike down durational residency requirements for voters); City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (successful challenge to a state franchise qualification
allowing only real property taxpayers to vote on certain issues); Evans v. Cornman, 396 U.S.
419 (1970) (Maryland voting law denying the right to vote to a resident of a federal reservation
violates the fourteenth amendment); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per
curiam) (equal protection clause used to void a Louisiana law giving only property taxpayers
the right to vote on the issue of revenue bonds for the city utility system); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (New York statute denying the vote to those members
in a school district who did not own or lease property or were not parents of enrolled school
children violated the equal protection clause).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, provides:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their re-
spective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote in any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress,
the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participa-
tion in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of the representation therein shall be reduced
in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
15. 94 S. Ct. at 2671.
16. Justice Rehnquist admits that historical interpretation is a difficult task. Id. at 2666.
The value of historical arguments is often questionable. See, e.g., C. MLLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Friedrich, Law and History, 14 VAND. L. Ray. 1027
(1961); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation,
31 U. CI. L. REv. 502 (1964).
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refer directly to the language employed. The Court concludes that
unless the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment can
be found to have intended more than the literal meaning of the
language "except for participation in rebellion or other crime," it is
committed to accepting a straight, unambiguous reading of this
provision. Underlying purpose and motive will not be used by the
majority to limit the apparent meaning and intent of this language.
In its effort to better understand the meaning behind § 2, the
Court recounted the legislative history surrounding its passage and
considered the intentions of both drafters and ratifiers. Handi-
capped by the sparse legislative history of § 2,1 the Court, in an
attempt to gain insight into the meaning intended by the framers,
relied primarily upon the deliberations of the Joint Committee of
Fifteen on Reconstruction, which drafted what ultimately became
the fourteenth amendment.
Reviewing the history of the bill, Justice Rehnquist noted the
introduction of a draft amendment by Senator Williams on April 28,
1866, which was later approved by a lopsided margin in the the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction." The Court then considered a ran-
dom sampling of comments by some of the chief architects of § 2.
The Court admitted the paucity of debate, but nevertheless felt
committed to examine the record in the hope that they might better
understand the meaning and intent behind these words. Remarks
by the liberal Congressmen John Bingham of Ohio, Thomsal Eliot
of Massachusetts, and Ephraim Eckley of Ohio, as well as some
floor discussion by the Senate, were offered by the Court as evidence
that the intentions of the framers and proponents of § 2 would only
be realized by a plain and simple reading. 9
A constitutional amendment is rarely the work of a single congres-
sional committee or a few leading statesmen; rather, it is the ex-
pressed intent of many Americans. Recognizing this, the Court at-
tempted to understand how the various states of the union inter-
preted the language of § 2 when they ratified it.1° Reviewing the
17. 94 S. Ct. at 2666. For some original source material see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1866); VIRGINIA COMM'N ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE RECONSTRUCrION
AMENDMENT'S DEBATES (1967).
18. 94 S. Ct. at 2666.
19. 94 S. Ct. at 2666-67.
20. The historical analysis and approach employed by the majority opinion closely paral-
lels the dissents by Justice Harlan in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97-100 (1965), and
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593-614 (1964).
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Reconstruction Act of 18671 and other readmission statutes, and
looking biiefly at state constitutional provisions," the Court rea-
soned that the states, too, meant exactly what they appeared to be
saying when they ratified § 2 of the fourteenth amendment. The
readmission statutes to which the Court referred are a series of
enabling acts, passed during 1868 and 1870, readmitting the South-
ern states to representation in Congress. These acts uniformly con-
tained a provision closely akin to § 2 of the fourteenth amendment.
The majority cites these enabling statutes as further confirmation
of its position that the ratifiers, as well as the framers, intended a
literal reading of this amendment.
Finally, the Court took a brief look at the judicial history of state
disenfranchisement provisions and was persuaded that this history
supports their constitutionality and the Court's interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment as recounted above. The Court relied pri-
marily upon two nineteenth century cases, Murphy v. Ramsey 3 and
Davis v. Beason.2" Both cases dealt with the constitutional propriety
of territorial laws which precluded bigamists and polygamists from
registering to vote. In Murphy, the petitioner unsuccessfully chal-
lenged a law which prohibited polygamists from registering to vote.
He claimed it was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law, since
disenfranchisement applied only to persons who were practicing po-
lygamy at the time they attempted to register.2 In Davis, the peti-
tioner claimed that an Idaho law disenfranchising members of or-
ganizations which supported and taught polygamy was a violation
of his first amendment rights.2 Here, too, the petitioner was unsuc-
cessful. Two recent summary affirmances issued by the Supreme
Court were used by the majority to update its argument and demon-
strate that judicial precedent, both old and new, supports its con-
clusion. In Fincher v. Scott,27 a memorandum decision, the Court
21. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428. The act's relevance is in its conditional tone:
for readmission to the Union, all states must provide male citizens twenty-one years or older
with the franchise, exluding from that protection any citizen disenfranchised for participation
in rebellion or other felony at common law.
22. Most of these state constitutional provisions openly disenfranchised those convicted
of crime, or at least directed their legislatures to do so if they saw fit.
23. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
24. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
25. 114 U.S. at 40-41.
26. 133 U.S. at 336-37.
27. 411 U.S. 961 (1973).
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affirmed a lower court ruling8 dismissing an ex-felon's constitu-
tional challenge to state legislative provisions which denied him the
right to vote. Similarly, in Beacham v. Braterman,21 the Court af-
firmed a district court ruling0 that a state may constitutionally
exclude convicted felons from the vote." Both petitioners in Fincher
and Beacham failed in their efforts to convince the Court of the
merits of their fourteenth.amendment claims.
Policy considerations and arguments were found unconvincing
and bore no influence on the Court's decision.12 Rather, the Court
felt bound by the clear and precise meaning of § 2 of the fourteenth
amendment, which affirmatively sanctions the exclusion of felons
from the vote. Conceding that the policy arguments presented by
respondents may have some merit, the Court declared its reluc-
tance to step into the shoes of the legislature, which was better
prepared to weigh and balance the values in question.
33
-Justice Marshall dissented on procedural grounds,u but since the
majority reached the merits of the claim, he recorded his dissent on
substantive grounds as well. To Justice Marshall, the special politi-
cal character of § 2 and its general overriding objectives 35 were clear
and dispositive of the issues in the case. He regarded § 2 as purely
a penalty provision, wholly independent of the equal protection
28. Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
29. 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
30. Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
31. However, the Florida Legislature has since changed its statutory provision disenfran-
chising criminal elements; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.05 (1973).
32. The majority, in assessing policy considerations, declared that "it's not for us to
choose one set of values over the other." 94 S. Ct. at 2671.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2672-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For Justice Marshall the case was both moot
and advisory in nature. See note 10 supra.
35. Justice Marshall is in full accord with the views of Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965
SuP. CT. REV. 33 [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne]. Van Alstyne, in discussing the political
objectives of § 2 said:
On the whole record . it seems quite impossible to conclude that there was a clear
and deliberate understanding in the House that § 2 was the sole source of national
authority to protect voting rights, or that it expressly recognized the states' power to
deny or abridge the right to vote. It may be closer to the mark to suggest that: (1)
Section 2 left the disputed respective powers of the state and federal government over
the franchise unaffected. (2) It was concerned with overcoming the apportionment
formula of Article I, the better to assure the power of Congress to reduce southern
representation in the House and Electoral College.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
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clause, and never intended as a limitation on any other sections of
the fourteenth amendment. The essence of the dissent's argument
was that § 2, with its peculiar legislative history and purposes, was
a political maneuver by a liberal, Republican Congress to maintain
political hegemony by forcing the Democratic South to enfranchise
the Negro voters or lose its congressional representation. Once Jus-
tice Marshall resolved the language problem presented by § 2, he
went on to employ an equal protection analysis similar to that used
by the Supreme Court of California in the Ramirez3l decision. He
measured the disenfranchisement of ex-felons against the require-
ments of the equal protection clause, as that clause has been inter-
preted in a variety of recent voting rights cases,37 and found that the
state failed to meet its burden of justifying such a wholesale restric-
tion on suffrage. Since other less restrictive means were available, u
he concluded, the state was compelled under recent case law"0 to
choose the path which is least burdensome on our constitutionally
protected rights.
BACKGROUND OF THE DECISION
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out, 0 the courts have traditionally
approved the disenfranchisement of felons," confirming that the
power to set voting qualifications is specifically reserved to the
states.4 2 The usual rationale for supporting such exclusions has been
36. 9 Cal. 3d at 206-17, 507 P.2d at 1349-57, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 141-49.
37. See cases cited note 13 supra.
38. 94 S. Ct. at 2683.
39. Id., citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting); Dunn
v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
40. 94 S. Ct. at 2670.
41. Id., citing Lassiter v. Northampton Co. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959)
(dictum); David v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 346-47 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15
(1885); Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048
(1968). See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (dictum); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 96-97 (1958) (dictum); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 n.13, (1946) (dictum);
Hayes v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 provides:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress . ...
See also Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904), in which the court said:
in other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State
itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem
1974
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the protection of the purity of the ballot box 3 although various other
reasons have been offered and accepted throughout history." Many
of the states continue to feel these same needs today and have either
enacted or maintained legislation depriving the criminal offender of
the right to vote.4" While twenty-five states automatically restore
the vote upon completion of either sentence or parole, almost fifty
proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals, in viola-
tion of the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 632. More recently the Court has said:
We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be required
of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence require-
ments, age, previous criminal record, are obvious examples indicating factors which a
State may take into consideration in determining the qualification of voters.
Lassiter v. Northhampton Co. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (footnotes omitted).
But for cases which have held that the general approval of state prerogative is always subject
to other constitutional standards see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651 (1884).
43. The oft-quoted leading state case on the subject of felon disenfranchisement and its
underlying objective is Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 51 Am. R. 479 (1884): "The manifest
purpose is to preserve the purity of the ballot box, which is the only sure foundation of
republican liberty .... " Id. at 585, 51 Am. R. at 481. See also Application of Marino, 23
N.J. Misc. 159, 42 A.2d 469 (C.P. Essex Co. 1945) (the purity of the electoral process was
presumed to be enhanced by legislation which denied felons the right to vote); State ex rel.
Barrett v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943).
44. Precedent may be found which supports the position that the underlying purpose
behind most voter disqualification statutes is Lockian at base-the maintenance of a pru-
dent and responsible electorate through the exclusion of parties who have shown themselves
to be contemptuous of our lawful processes; see Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451
(2d Cir. 1967), "A man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his own
governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned the right to participate in
further administering the compact .... ; Boyd v. Mills, 53 Kan. 594, 37 P. 16, 17 (1894),
where the court declared:
In determining who shall exercise the right of suffrage, may not the people exclude
classes who have shown themselves unfaithful to a public trust, or who have engaged
in hostilities against either the state or federal government?
Id. at 603, 37 P. at 17. See also Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 532, 578-79 (1865). For a general
discussion of legislative purpose and disenfranchisement statutes see Du Fresne, The Case
for Allowing 'Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for Judges': Beyond Green v. Board of Elections of
New York City, 19 DE PAUL L. Rav. 112, 121-27 (1969); Comment, The Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. Rav. 929, 982-83 (1971). Delaware is apparently
the only state which clearly permits the legislature to disenfranchise criminals as additional
punishment; see DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2. But see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), denying
by way of dictum that such disenfranchisement statutes are legitimate exercises of a state's
penal authority.
45. Only four states, Maine, Michigan, Tennessee and Arkansas, do not deny the vote to
convicted criminals. Twenty-three states automatically revoke the privilege upon conviction,
but restore it upon successful completion of sentencing or parole. For a complete breakdown
of each state's approach to this problem see Note, Restoring the Ex-Offender's Right to Vote:
Background and Developments, 11 AM. CfaM. L. REV. 721 (1974).
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percent continue to disenfranchise the ex-offender for the rest of his
life,4" denying him forever an effective political voice. The opinion
rendered by this Court will immediately affect numerous ex-
offenders" who want to exercise the franchise and will eventually
affect the voting rights of all persons presently incarcerated.
INTER-RELATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND § 2
The majority believed that the express language of § 2 of the
fourteenth amendment specifically excludes ex-felons from the
more general protective principles of the equal protection clause.
This same proposition, so critical to the central issues of the case,
was first advanced in Green v. Board of Elections of the City of
N. Y 48 There a federal court held that the petitioner had not pre-
sented a substantial federal question, and found no violation of
the equal protection clause, reading'that clause in conjunction with
the more detailed and specific language of § 2. The court in Green
declared that the framers of the fourteenth amendment could not
have intended the broad language of the equal protection clause to
forbid a discrimination which § 2 obviously allowed."9 As in Green,
the majority in the present case considered § 2 to be the only rele-
vant provision; its legislative history was felt to be critical to a
thorough understanding of its meaning.
But the legislative history the majority found so essential to its
analysis was given only a cursory treatment. The selective nature
of the Court's legislative accounting becomes obvious when we real-
ize that the draft amendment cited by Justice Rehnquist as having
been introduced in April, 1866, was actually introduced in January
of that year" and did not include the critical language relied on by
the petitioner.5' Furthermore, the earlier draft of § 2 met with over-
46. Id. at 727.
47. The California Supreme Court in Ramirez estimated that there are at least 100,000
ex-felons in the state of California alone. 9 Cal. 3d at 203 n.2, 507 P.2d at 1347 n.2, 107 Cal.
Rptr. at 139 n.2 (1973).
48. 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967). However, since the decision in Green, New York has
amended its election statutes to provide for automatic restoration of voting rights to all felons
who have successfully completed their sentence or parole; see N.Y. ELECTION LAw § 152
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
49. 380 F.2d at 452.
50. For a complete chronology of the bill see Van Alstyne, supra note 35, at 86.
51. It will be recalled that § 2 provides:
1974
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whelming approval in the House,5" but failed to muster the requisite
two-thirds vote for passage in the Senate.5 3 These facts surrounding
the earlier draft of the amendment were inconsequential to the ma-
jority, who obviously felt that the intent of the drafters of § 2 was
to be gleaned more from a twentieth century dictionary understand-
ing of the language than from a thorough investigation into the
events which produced the final amendment.
The central difference between the historical approaches of the
dissent and majority opinions was in the weight given to the legisla-
ti've purposes and motives behind the passage of § 2. According to
Justice Marshall and most constitutional historians, the political
exigencies of the times were the chief factors behind the drafting
and passage of § 2.11 The only real dispute over the purposes behind
the passage of § 2 is this: Did the drafters have the loftier ideal in
mind of encouraging and extending suffrage to the newly emanci-
pated slaves who, in turn, would then support the Republican North
as their benefactors and liberators; 5 or was § 2 simply a move to
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers . . . .But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced ....
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. However, the Joint Committee's original proposal took the
following form:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States . . . : Provided, that
whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of
race or color, the persons therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis
of representation.
AMES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1889, at 52.
There was no mention of excluding criminal elements from the franchise in this original draft.
52. The House overwhelmingly approved this draft amendment with 120 yeas to 46 nays;
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 538 (1866).
53. Id. at 1289. In late April, the bill was amended and revised to meet its current form,
passing the House on May 10th and the Senate, with minor changes, on June 8th, and was
finally accepted by House concurrence on June 13th. Van Alstyne, supra note 35, at 86.
54. H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965) [hereinafter cited as
FLACK]; JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956) [hereinafter cited as
JAMES]; Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of Section Two of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 46 CORN. L.Q. 108 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield]; Van Alstyne,
supra note 35, at 65; Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 93 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Zuckerman].
55. JAMES, supra note 54, at 129. James feels that § 2 was aimed at state laws which retard
suffrage: "[Wlhere the state has consciously decided . ..that a group of citizens are unfit
to exercise the right to vote-that the penalty of § 2 should be applied." Id.
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humble and punish the South, with no forethought given to the
expansion of suffrage?" The Thirty-Ninth Congress, convened in
the wake of war, had recently abolished slavery through the thir-
teenth amendment. Its passage had tremendously upset the delicate
balance of power between a Republican North and a Democratic
South, a balance which had been maintained through article I of the
Constitution.-7 Indeed, the legislative history of § 2, as well as the
fact that it has lain idle for over a century," point to a conclusion
that this section was nothing more than the by-product of a strained
political atmosphere, and that our illustrious forefathers were more
concerned with partisan matters than great principles of govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the majority opinion ignored these facts, and
focused solely on the express language of § 2, giving no consideration
to the actual purposes of this provision.5"
COMMENTARY ON PRIOR CASE LAW
The decisional law relevant to the issues presented by respon-
dents appears to be split, at least in the lower courts,60 and what
56. FLACK, supra note 54, at 105. A slightly different emphasis is taken by Flack, who feels
that § 2 was drafted to reduce Southern leadership and representation, a result which would
naturally follow when the Negro was denied the vote. This reduced representation would then
offset any possible gains that a Democratic South would glean from the thirteenth amend-
ment and the abolition of the old three-fifths status of the former slaves. A third position,
assumed by Zuckerman, supra note 54, has been suggested as an underlying objective of § 2.
At the time § 2 was proposed, a large number of citizens had lost the vote by their participa-
tion in rebellion, particularly in the border states like Missouri. Section 2, he argues, was an
assurance by Congress that these disenfranchised rebels would not cost the state any loss in
representation.
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, provides in pertinent part:
Representatives .. .shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, .... three fifths of all other
Persons.
58. Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946),
was one of the few attempts ever made to enforce the penalty provision of § 2. The petitioner
in Saunders unsuccessfully challenged the validity of the Virginia poll tax which disenfran-
chised 60 per cent of Virginia's residents. He argued that Virginia's representational base
should be reduced accordingly as mandated by § 2 of the fourteenth amendment. See also
Bonfield, supra note 54, at 108, for a clever suggestion on implementing § 2 in order to expand
suffrage.
59. It should be recalled that § 2 is couched in the language of an enumeration principle,
with reapportionment its obvious objective.
60. Two lower court cases which have upheld state disenfranchisement provisions are
Hayes v. Williams, 341 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Tex. 1972), and Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F.
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little case law the Supreme Court has produced seems to be of
dubious merit. The earlier nineteenth century cases relied upon,
Murphy v. Ramsey,"' and Davis v. Beason,"2 were decisions handed
down before the fourteenth amendment was used to invalidate state
voter qualifications. 3 Furthermore, the proposition for which these
cases stand, that a state may disenfranchise a group of voters in
order to protect the established order from hostile elements, has
been recently eroded by the Court. 4 While the nineteenth century
saw minority opinion as a threat to the status quo, this century has
witnessed a far more sophisticated and libertarian view of minority
voices. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its position
that citizens may not be excluded from the franchise because of the
way they might cast their ballots."
The two recent decisions relied on by the majority, Fincher v.
Scott"6 and Beacham v. Braterman,"7 were summary affirmances,
and as such their precedential value is somewhat limited. Justice
Rehnquist himself has only recently informed us that summary af-
firmances are clearly not of the same value as cases decided on the
merits and given plenary consideration by the Court.8 And Justice
Rehnquist's own findings have found support in a recent Washing-
ton case"8 challenging provisions of state law which deprived paroled
ex-felons of the right to vote.
Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Two cases which have struck down disenfranchisement statutes
are Stephens v. Yeomans. 327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970), and Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469
F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1972).
61. 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
62. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
63. It will be recalled that the petitioner in Murphy claimed that the particular law in
question was ex post facto; in Davis the claim was based on the first amendment.
64. Cases cited note 65 infra.
65. See Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974); Evans v. Cornman, 396 U.S.
419. 423 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969) (per curiam); and
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) where the Court explicitly held that "Fencing out
from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is
constitutionally impermissible."
66. 411 U.S. 961 (1973).
67. 396 U.S. 12 (1969).
68. Edelman v. Jordon, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974), where Justice Rehnquist himself noted:
Equally obviously [Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 168, and three summary affirm-
ances thereof] are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this
Court treating the question on the merits. Since we deal with a constitutional question,
we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of
the law.
Id. at 1359.
69. Dillenburg v. Kramer. 469 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1972). The Dillenburg court took the
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Even conceding that Davis, Murphy, Beacham and Fincher
should be paid homage by the Court, the case law in the area of
voting rights generally compels a very different interpretation than
that employed by the majority. The history of suffrage in the United
States might easily be described as a move from privilege to
right-from a privileged ten percent voting in the nineteenth cen-
tury to a voting base which now includes nearly all Americans over
the age of eighteen.70 Sex, color, property holdings, conditions of
past servitude, and age7' have been abolished as criteria. As early
as 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,72 the Court recognized that the
franchise is a fundamental right because it acts to preserve and
maintain all other rights.73 It was not until the Warren era, however,
that the Court worked actively to give content and meaning to the
constitutional platitudes of the nineteenth century." In recent judi-
cial history, the franchise has been considerably expanded" and
weighted 76 with the Court regarding any infringement upon that
position that "[a] summary affirmance without opinion in a case within the Supreme
Court's obligatory appellate jurisdiction has very little precedential significance." Id. at 1225.
See also Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 600, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1971); Frankfurter
& Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 H~Av. L. REy. 1, 14
(1930).
70. R. STOREY, OUR INALIENABLE RIGHrs 47 (1965); Kirby, The Constitutional Right to
Vote, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 995 (1970) (discussing the tremendous expansion of political equality
in this country as the courts have gradually brought the right to vote within the ambit of first
amendment guarantees).
71. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 612 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX, XV, XXVI.
72. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
73. Id. at 370.
74. See, e.g., the reapportionment decisions of the Warren Court: Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368
(1963). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
75. For cases involving expansion of the right to vote see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204
(1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam). For cases involving pre-
trial detainees and expansion of the right to vote see O'Brian v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974)
(invalidated a New York election scheme which denied convicted misdemeanants and pre-
trial detainees the right to register or vote by absentee ballot); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512
(1973) which involved an absolute denial of the vote to pre-trial detainees and, therefore, was
not governed by the Court's earlier holding in McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802 (1969). The petitioners in McDonald failed because they could not demonstrate that
they were absolutely prohibited from voting, but could only show that they were denied access
to absentee ballots.
76. See the reapportionment cases cited note 74 supra; Westbrook v. Mihaly, 403 U.S.
915 (1971) (vacated on other grounds); Rimarcik v. Johansen, 310 F. Supp. 61 (D. Minn.
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right with meticulous scrutiny." Nor has this expansion of suffrage
been limited to the judicial sphere of governmental action, for Con-.
gress, too, has seen and attested to the need for this country to
include all elements in the electoral processes of government," be
they the young, the dissident or the illiterate.
CONCLUSIONS
In assuming a position which levels all articles and amendments
of the Constitution to a position of equal weight and merit, the
Court took the simpler interpretive route, but one which overlooked
the historical complexities which surround any given event. In de-
ciding that § 2 alone governs the issues of this case, the majority not
only ignored the immediate history surrounding the passage of the
fourteenth amendment but denied over one hundred years of judi-
cial and legislative interpretation which has developed and refined
our understanding of the equal protection clause-a clause which
has helped to build a more egalitarian society, one which responds
to the needs of all its members by giving them a real and effective
voice in its governing processes.
Futhermore, the Court openly ignored the practical ramifications
of this decision,7" claiming that such considerations belong solely to
the legislative branch. This decision enlarges an already enormous
gulf which exists between the ex-offender and society. It overlooks
not only recent advances in voting rights generally, but also this
century's changing concepts of criminal justice.80 The medieval atti-
1970). Both Westbrook and Rimarcik dealt with dilution of the voting power of affirmative
voters when state laws required over 50% approval of the electorate on certain issues.
77. The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated a rigid standard of review in cases
where state laws grant the vote to some, while denying it to others. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S.
512 (1973); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
78. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1970), amending Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1965), where age, residency and literacy requirements
were all considerably altered and reduced.
79. See, e.g., Galloway v. Council of Clark, 92 N.J. Super. 409, 223 A.2d 644 (1966), where
.a city councilman found himself in the anomalous situation of being able to vote on city
ordinances as part of his official duties, yet unable to vote in regular public elections due to
his disenfranchisement for an offense committed while in office.
80. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT ch. 8 (1967), in which the Commission adopted the ALI MODEL PENAL
CODE § 306.3, denying criminal offenders the vote only while under sentence.
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tude of vindictiveness and retribution is shifting to a more enlight-
ened, humanitarian stance, and the goals of incarceration are now
rehabilitative and corrective, not penal. But the decision taken by
this Court could hardly be described as one which will be conducive
to re-incorporating the ex-offender into society as a full and partici-
pating member. Ideally, these issues should be raised and settled by
the legislature, but it is naive to suppose that state legislatures
across the country are going to take the time and effort to alter
existing legislation, and in many cases repeal and draft constitu-
tional amendments, when their constituents care little for the lot of
the ex-offender. In turning its back on the ex-felon and denying him
the only realistic path for redress of his grievances, the Court makes
a mockery of the concept of rehabilitation, leaving the "mark of
Cain" indelibly impressed upon the ex-offender for life.
Anne M. Nelson
MONOPOLIES-COMBINATION AND CONSPIRACY-INDUCING GOVERN-
MENT ACTION- CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-RIGHT
OF PETITION-The United States Supreme Court has held, in
a private action under the Clayton Act, that a cause of action
was stated where it was alleged that a group of interstate motor
carriers conspired to monopolize trade and commerce in the trans-
portation of goods by engaging in concerned activities to institute
actions in state and federal courts and agencies to resist and defeat
plaintiff's applications for operating licenses.
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972).
The respondents, highway carriers in California and plaintiffs
below, filed a civil action under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' They
sought injunctive relief and damages against petitioners, who are
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendent resides or is found or has an agent, without
respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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